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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the effect of political instability on international investment and trade 
in Pakistan. The sample comprised of annual data for a period of 41 years (from 1976 to 2016). To 
test the long and short run relationships among the variables, ARDL model is applied and particular-
ly Error Correction Model is used for short run analysis. To check the serial correlation in the ECM 
models, LM serial correlation test is applied. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) is also utilized to test the 
stability of the ARDL models. The unit root of all the variables is also tested and it is found that all 
the variables are stationary either at level or at first difference. Findings conclude that political in-
stability badly hampers both the international investment and trade in the long-run. Moreover, in 
short-run, the political instability significantly hinders the foreign portfolio investment and exports. 
No significant impact of political instability is found on foreign direct investment and imports in the 
long run. 
Keywords: Political Instability, International Investment, Trade, Imports 
 
Introduction 
In retrospect, the political situation of any country has always been a key factor in interna-
tional business. It has been a center of attention for both researchers and practitioners in recent 
years.  Asiedu (2000) found that political instability and corruption, to a large extent, demote FDI. A 
politically unstable condition simply refers a situation where country’s resources are mismanaged or 
not used to their full potential. Alesina et al (1996) analyzed that politically unstable situations dis-
courage investment, trade and economic growth. Abu, Karim and Aziz (2014) found the political 
instability is greatly contributing towards underdevelopment and corruption. Le and Zak (2001) 
concluded political risk to be the main factor in producing capital flight. This implies that interna-
tional investment and trade highly depends on the political environment in the host country. 
Lall and Narulla (2004) found foreign investment to be necessary for economic develop-
ment. In this regard, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has a unique role of booming the economy of 
developing countries as it comes along with loads of capital, technology and employment opportuni-
ties. As researched by Gorg and Greenaway (2003) FDI not only brings capital formation but also 
comes along with best technology, practice and management. At the same time, political unrest is 
the main concern for foreign investors in making investment decisions. As argued by Butler and 
Joaquin (1998) that cash flow effect of political risk is of high interest to investors. Goswami and 
Haider (2014) also confirmed that failure of the Government is the underlying factor towards poor 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows. Lastly, Shah and Ahmed (2002) found the market strength, mi-
nimized costs associated risks and workable public contracts to be the pre-conditions for constantly 
boosting FDI inflows. 
Developing countries like Pakistan always strive for sustainable economic growth. In this 
context, the policy framework for any country is crucial in determining the determinants for its 
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overall economic growth. Buthe and Milner (2008) confirmed International Trade agreements en-
courage developing countries to attract FDI that boost economic growth. Recognizing that interna-
tional trade contribution towards overall development, many developing countries want to attract it. 
Many economists believed that trade liberalization policy and higher trade volume are strongly and 
positively associated with each other. As by Edwards (1992) open economies grow faster as com-
pared to the economies possessing trade distortions. Keeping this in view, many developing coun-
tries have minimized trade barriers anticipating that the international contact can enhance the per-
formance of local firms. Thus, the policies of a country that allow its economy to open and integrate 
with the world economy can have more chances to attract international trade. 
With more attention towards trade openness frameworks, governments are trying to facilitate 
imports and exports. Still economic determinants are crucial in determining the countries that offer 
more rewards to investors and possess location advantage. Such scenarios highlight the need to 
study the effect of political situation in defining the direction of international investment and trade. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of political instability on investment and 
foreign trade in a fluctuating economy like Pakistan. The causal association between the variables is 
also inspected. Moreover, Inflation, Trade volume, FDI inflows and FPI are examined.  
This study’s econometric results will contribute to supplement the existing literature in con-
text of Pakistan by applying ARDL model testing approach. The research conclusion will assist Pa-
kistan’s policy makers in implementing suitable strategies regarding import, exports, FDI, FPI and a 
room for policy examination. 
 
Literature Review 
Several studies have been led on the issue of political instability and its resulting effect on 
Investment. This chapter further divides in two sections, one is the impact of political instability on 
investment and second impact of political instability on trade of Pakistan. 
Impact of Political Instability on Investment 
FDI plays a more viable role in transferring technology and contributing more towards 
growth as compared to domestic investment (Borensztein et al., 1998). Developing countries that 
have low income per capita, huge domestic markets as well as investment ratios tend to attract more 
FDI (Edwards, 1990). The analysis of prior literature on political instability and investment is given 
below. 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) investigated the relationship between corruption and Foreign 
Direct Investment. A sample of eighty nine countries is incorporated for the period of 1996-1998. 
They employed OLS regression results revealed that foreign investors avoid corruption as they do 
not consider it legal. Moreover, they consider corruption risky, costly and difficult to manage which 
ultimately results in operational inefficiencies. 
Afza and Anwar (2013) explored the factors which affected foreign direct investment in Pa-
kistan from the year 1980 to 2010 by using OLS and ARMA model. Since the study used time series 
data, therefore to measure the stationarity of variables, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root 
test was applied. The results reported that electricity generation, market size, exchange rate stability, 
trade openness and incentives provided to investors positively influence FDI whereas war against 
terrorism, political instability and inflation negatively influence FDI inflows in Pakistan. 
Khan and Akbar (2013) made a review on negative relationship between FDI and political 
instability for ninety-four countries (sub-divided as Low-Income Countries, Lower Middle-Income 
Countries, Upper Middle-Income Countries and High-Income Countries) over a period of 24 years 
i.e. from 1986-2009. The conclusion depicts that FDI was negatively affected by the many political 
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risk indicators for the overall world including high-income countries, but among upper middle-
income countries the strongest relationship was proved. 
Nasreen and Anwar (2014) examined the impact of political risk in attracting FDI inflow to-
wards Pakistan. The data used is from 1981 to 2012. The ARDL approach was used to measure the 
consequences of political risk on both short-run and long-run relationship. To find the stationarity of 
time series variables, the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) unit test was used. Lastly the constancy of 
ARDL model was tested by running the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests. The study concluded that 
FDI inflows are unfavorably affected by political risk index in short-run as well as long-run in Pa-
kistan. The study further suggested in Pakistan per capita GDP and quality of infrastructure to be 
positively related while inflation and exchange rate are hampering negatively to FDI inflows in the 
country. 
Rani and Batool (2016) analyzed the relationship among FDI, economic development and 
political instability for Pakistan and the underlying variables affecting it. The study undertaken was 
between the years of 1980 – 2013 to find the short run as well as long run relationship among politi-
cal instability, FDI and economic development. For estimation, ARDL technique is incorporated by 
applying Wald Test for finding long run relationship and OLS & Error Correction Model for short 
run relationship between HDI and various independent variables. Time series data used consisted of 
the period of 33 years. The results reported negative relationship to exist between economic devel-
opment and political instability but found the positive connections to be existed between FDI and 
economic development. 
Nazeer and Masih (2017) analyzed the causal relationship among political instability, FDI 
and economic growth as a case of Malaysia, in particular. The study covered the period of 30 years 
starting from 1984 to 2013. The ARDL framework was adopted to create co-integration and thus the 
direction of causation among variables. By applying Variance Decompositions (VDC), GDP was 
found to be extreme exogenous whereas Political Instability to be extreme endogenous followed by 
FDI. The study also used Impulse Response (IR) based on VAR model to find the impact of shock 
of political instability on other variables. The findings showed political instability to be cointegrated 
with FDI and growth of economy. 
Impact of Political Instability on Trade 
International trade brings peace and stability in the country by stimulating economic devel-
opment (Cukierman et al. 1992). However, Political instability disturbs smooth functioning of trade 
by affecting income and prices directly and investment in physical capital indirectly (Bashir et al. 
2013). How far political instability is affecting trade it is normally observed through that how far 
imports and exports of the country are affected by the political instability.  
Politically stable countries export more (Srivastava and Green, 1986). Fosu (2003) argued 
that political instability negatively affect expected return which results in capital flight, that ulti-
mately disturbs the exports of the country. The imports of a politically unstable country are affected 
due to down surge in its economic growth and other factors including income, interest rate, domestic 
price level, unemployment and exchange rate (Collins, 1996); (Roubini, 1991).  
Fosu (2003) found the relationship between political instability and export performance for 
sample of 30 sub-Saharan Africa countries from the period 1967-1986.  The regression results 
founded by the estimation of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Hausman-Wu test showed that po-
litical instability is damaging more to exports as compared to overall GDP. 
Bussmann et al. (2006) examined the relationship between trade liberalization or economic 
openness and political instability with data from 90 developed countries from 1978-1997. The re-
gression logistic was used for estimation. All tests conducted used white-corrected standard errors to 
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resolve the problem of heteroscedasticity. By using Multivariate Regression analysis, it was con-
cluded that the more economically open countries tend to be more stable which simply means that 
domestic conflicts can be reduced if countries get merged with world economy. Moreover, the for-
eign economic liberalization does not give rise to political instability. 
Oh and Reuveny (2010) analyzed the effect of disaster incidents and increasing political risk 
on the importing or exporting countries and the sample comprised of 116 countries from 1985 to 
2013 By employing OLS estimation and Huber-White estimator, the study concluded that rise in 
climatic disasters or political hazards decreases bilateral trade. 
Bashir et al. (2013) focused on studying the potential impact of foreign political instability 
on Chinese exports. The sample comprised of 121 importing countries, covering time period from 
1988 to 2011. The data comprising of real GDP, population, exchange rate, Political Safety index, 
imports and exports was analyzed using alternative dynamic panel and dynamic system generalized 
method of moments (SGMM). Findings conclude that foreign political instability has negative and, 
real exchange rate and income have a positive impact on Chinese exports. 
Khan et al. (2015) studied the impact of political Instability on Pakistan’s exports using time 
series data from 1991- 2010. The method used is Regression analysis and ANOVA. The study con-
cluded the negative relationship between political instability and exports. 
Afolabi and Abu Bakar (2016) examined the causal link between FDI inflow, trade volume, 
political instability and economic growth in Nigeria from 1981-2012. The study used co-integration 
analysis and Multivariate Granger causality test is applied using VECM approach. A bi-directional 
causation was found to exist between FDI inflow and economic growth and one-way direction ex-
isted between political instability & GDP, and between FDI and trade volume. 
 
Methodology 
Research Design and Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Political Instability, International Investment and Trade Nexus 
Source: Authors’ Development 
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This research analyzes the impact of political instability on international investment and 
trade of Pakistan. To examine this relationship, our main explanatory variable in this study is politi-
cal instability Index. The dependent variables for trade include growth of imports and exports. 
Moreover, the dependent variables for Investment include net inflows of foreign direct investment 
and foreign portfolio investment. The sample comprises of Annual time series data over a span of 41 
years from 1976 to 2016. Following the previous literature other control variables have also been 
included in the study to improve the precision of the model. 
Data Specifications 
For most of the indicators the data was collected from the World Development Indicators 
2018 except the political instability index. Qureshi et.al (2010) constructed political instability index 
from 1971 to 2005. By taking this methodology the index is further updated to 2016.  
Explanatory Variable: Political Instability Index 
In this research paper, Political Instability index is used for the Political Instability. By using 
the methodology of Qureshi et.al (2010) with the same variables for the political instability index is 
updated to 2016 which was for 1971 to 2005. The index is updated by applying Principal Compo-
nent Method. The PC1 summary is given below: 
 
Table 1. Factor Loadings of PC1 
Variables PCI 
Government Longevity -0.126** 
General Strikes 0.411* 
Riots 0.319** 
Regime Type -0.158*** 
Demonstrations 0.324** 
Government change 0.418** 
War 0.457* 
Note: ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
Critical values from Koutsoyiannis (1977) 
 
PI = 0.126E1 + 0.411E2 + 0.319E3 - 0.158E4 + 0.324E5 + 0.418E6 - 0.457E7 
Where  
E2 = General Strikes  
E1 = Government Longevity  E4 = Regime Type 
E3 = Riots E6 = Government change including coup 
E5 = Demonstrations   
E7 = War  
 
On the basis of the mentioned equation, political instability is updated. Brief description of 
the variables of political instability index can be found in annexure A. 
Dependent Variables 
The International investment in any country can be in two forms, that is FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment) and FPI (Foreign Portfolio Investment). The data on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Net Inflows (% of GDP), Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) Net (% of GDP) has been obtained. 
The International trade is carried out through imports and exports. For this study the data on Annual 
percentage growth rates of exports and imports have been obtained. 
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Control Variables 
The control variables have been selected by following the literature. 
 GDP Per Capita: Gross Domestic Product Per Capita holds the level of income 
which is why it is considered to be important for foreign investors as a increased level of income. 
The association of GDP per capita with FDI has always been an area of interest for researchers. For 
instance, Martinez- Zarzoso (2003), Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak- Lehmann (2004), Nasreen and 
Anwar (2014) discussed that as much as the level of income is higher of the country, the more inter-
est of foreign investors it attracts to invest in that country. Real GDP per capita growth has been uti-
lized to quantify the GDP.  
 Inflation Rate: This variable is thought-out as one of the significant factor in deter-
mining the FDI inflows. Higher the rate of inflation leads to macroeconomic instability of the econ-
omy, and thus reduces FDI flows. Kolstad and Villanger (2008) discovered negative relationship 
between inflation and FDI inflows within 74 countries from the globe. Najaf and Najaf (2016) con-
cluded inflation to have insignificant effect on FDI inflows in Pakistan. Likewise, Afza and Anwar 
(2013) proposed inflation to negatively influence FDI inflows in Pakistan. Houck (1979) concluded 
that changes in currencies bring changes in prices and costs which may rouse or reduce international 
transactions of products and services. Inflation rate is used as factor for FDI inflows and internation-
al trade. 
 Exchange rate: Countries that do not have strong currency always strive to attract 
more FDI so that foreign investors may benefit from better purchasing power in these countries. In 
contrast, countries that have stable currencies usually discourage FDI flows as investing in such 
countries is reflected to be much expensive. Love and Lage- Hidalgo (2000) found indirect relation-
ship to exist between exchange rate and FDI inflow, which shows that devaluation of foreign cur-
rency tends to attract more FDI in a country. Unlikely, Froot and Stein (1991) and Campa (1993) 
concluded that when currency of host country is appreciated, it then encourages FDI inflows in host 
countries. Pozo (1992) proposed that increase in the instability of the real exchange rate discourage 
the volume of trade. In contrast, Tenreyro (2007) suggested that change in exchange rate has no im-
pact on trade flows. Official exchange rate of local currency is being utilized to find out the ex-
change rate in the country. 
 Trade Openness: It measures aggregate trade (i.e. total of imports and exports of 
goods and services) as a ratio of GDP. Trade openness is a key determinant of FDI.  Brahim and 
Souria (2017) suggested trade openness to have a greater impact on FDI. Likewise, Afza and Anwar 
(2013) confirmed that trade openness has positively influence FDI. 
 FDI, Net Flow: A country's balance of payments shows how much it saves that is 
sufficient to pay for its imports. It also shows whether the country is making enough economic out-
put to compensate for its growth. The FDI net flow, BOP is used in this study as control variable for 
trade. 
 
Econometric Models 
Political Instability and International Investment 
Following econometric models are formulated to access the impact of political instability on 
international investment: 
ܨܦܫ௧ = ∝଴+  ߛܲܫ௧ +  ߣܥ ௧ܸ +  ߝ௧ … (1) 
ܨܲܫ௧ = ∝଴+  ߛܲܫ௧ +  ߣܥ ௧ܸ + ߝ௧ … (2) 
Where, 
ܨܦܫ = Foreign Direct Investment 
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ܨܲܫ = Foreign Portfolio Investment 
ܲܫ = Political Instability Index 
ܥܸ= Set of control variables described above and following notations will be used to 
represent these variables:  
ܩܦܲ = GDP Per Capita (Annual Growth Rate) 
ܫܰܨ = Inflation Rate 
ܱܶܲ = Trade Openness 
ܱܧܺܥ = Official Exchange Rate 
ߝ௧ = Error Term 
 
Political Instability and International Trade 
The econometric models formulated to access the impact of political instability on interna-
tional trade are as under: 
ܫܯ ௧ܲ = ∝଴+  ߛܲܫ௧ +  ߣܥ ௧ܸ +  ߝ௧ … (3) 
ܧܺ ௧ܲ = ∝଴+  ߛܲܫ௧ +  ߣܥ ௧ܸ + ߝ௧ … (4) 
Where, 
ܫܯܲ = Imports of Goods and Services (Annual % growth) 
ܧܺܲ = Exports of Goods and Services (Annual % growth) 
ܲܫ = Political Instability Index 
ܥܸ= Set of control variables described above and following notations will be used to 
represent these variables:  
ܫܰܨ = Inflation Rate 
ܨܦܫܰܧܶ = Foreign Direct Investment, Net 
ܱܧܺܥ = Official Exchange Rate 
ߝ௧ = Error Term 
 
Econometric Methodology 
In this empirical investigation, we move through two main stages.  
Unit Root Test 
The first stage in empirical investigation is to examine the stationarity of all the variables. 
The time series data must be stationary in order to provide non-spurious results of regression. The 
most common methods used to test the stationarity are Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phil-
lips Perron (PP) test; however, we have also employed Dicky-Fuller generalized least square (DF-
GLS) because it is more suitable for small sample data set (Alimi, 2014).  
Autoregressive Distributive Lag Model 
Pesaran and Shin (1995) and Pesaran et al. (2001) recommended Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to co-integration in the second stage. ARDL technique has 
resolved the endogeneity problem. Appropriate number of lags is estimated in ARDL that solves 
both the problems of endogeneity and auto-correlation (Pesaran and Shin, 1995). In ARDL approach 
both long-run and short-run coefficients are estimated simultaneously, and all the variables are con-
sidered endogenous (Khan et al., 2005).  
Political Instability and International Investment 
Following unrestricted error correction ARDL model equations are used for testing relation 
of Political Instability with FDI and FPI. 
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Δܨܦܫ௧ =
߮଴ + ∑ ߮ଵ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔFDI௧ି௜  + ∑ ߮ଶ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔPI௧ି௜  +  ∑ ߮ଷ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔGDP௧ି௜ +  ∑ ߮ସ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔINF௧ି௜ +
 ∑ ߮ହ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔTOP௧ି௜ +  ∑ ߮଺௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔOEXC௧ି௜ +  ߣଵܨܦܫ௧ିଵ + ߣଶܲܫ௧ିଵ +  ߣଷܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ +  ߣସܫܰܨ௧ିଵ +
 ߣହܱܶ ௧ܲିଵ + ߣ଺ܱܧܺܥ௧ିଵ + ߝ௧ … (5) 
 
Δܨܲܫ௧ =
 ߮଴ + ∑ ߮ଵ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔFPI௧ି௜  + ∑ ߮ଶ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔPI௧ି௜  +  ∑ ߮ଷ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔGDP௧ି௜ +  ∑ ߮ସ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔINF௧ି௜ +
 ∑ ߮ହ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔOEXC௧ି௜ +  ߣଵܨܲܫ௧ିଵ + ߣଶܲܫ௧ିଵ +  ߣଷܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ +  ߣସܫܰܨ௧ିଵ + ߣହܱܧܺܥ௧ିଵ + ߝ௧ …(6) 
 
Political Instability and International Trade 
Following unrestricted error correction ARDL model equations are used for testing relation 
of Political Instability with Imports and Exports. 
Δܫܯ ௧ܲ =
 ߮଴ + ∑ ߮ଵ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔIMP௧ି௜  + ∑ ߮ଶ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔPI௧ି௜  +  ∑ ߮ଷ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔINF௧ି௜ +  ∑ ߮ସ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔFDINET௧ି௜ +
 ∑ ߮ହ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔOEXC௧ି௜ +  ߣଵܫܯ ௧ܲିଵ + ߣଶܲܫ௧ିଵ + ߣଷܫܰܨ௧ିଵ + ߣସܨܦܫܰܧ ௧ܶିଵ + ߣହܱܧܺܥ௧ିଵ + ߝ௧… 
(7) 
 
Δܧܺ ௧ܲ =  ߮଴  + ∑ ߮ଵ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔEXP௧ି௜   + ∑ ߮ଶ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔPI௧ି௜   + ∑ ߮ଷ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔINF௧ି௜  +
 ∑ ߮ସ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔFDINET௧ି௜ +   ∑ ߮ହ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔOEXC௧ି௜ +  ߣଵܧܺ ௧ܲିଵ + ߣଶܲܫ௧ିଵ +  ߣଷܫܰܨ௧ିଵ +
 ߣସܨܦܫܰܧ ௧ܶିଵ + ߣହܱܧܺܥ௧ିଵ + ߝ௧… (8) 
 
In above equations (5-8), Δ is the first-difference operator, ߮s represent short run coeffi-
cients and ߣs represents long-run coefficients ߝ௧ is the white noise error term.  
The null hypothesis of non-existence of long run relationship is as follows: 
H଴ =  λଵ =  λଶ = λଷ = λସ = λହ = λ଺ = 0 ... (9) 
The alternative hypothesis showing the existence of the long run relationship among the va-
riables is as follows: 
Hଵ =  λଵ  ≠ λଶ ≠ λଷ ≠ λସ ≠ λହ ≠ λ଺ ≠ 0 ... (10) 
In the next step the bound test is conducted for null hypothesis by comparing the calculated 
F-statistic with critical bounds suggested by Narayan (2005). This paper used Narayan (2005) criti-
cal values instead of those provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) because Narayan’s values are generated 
for small sample sizes from 30 to 80 observations.  
Long-Run Parameters 
The next step is to find the long-run parameters using OLS regression under the following 
equations 11-14: 
Political Instability and International Investment 
ܨܦܫ௧ = ߣ଴ + ߣଵܲܫ௧ +  ߣଶܩܦ ௧ܲ + ߣଷܫܰܨ௧ +  ߣସܱܶ ௧ܲ + ߣହܱܧܺܥ௧ + ߝ௧ … (11) 
ܨܲܫ௧ = ߣ଴ + ߣଵܲܫ௧ +  ߣଶܩܦ ௧ܲ +  ߣଷܫܰܨ௧ + ߣସܱܧܺܥ௧ + ߝ௧ … (12) 
Political Instability and International Trade 
ܫܯ ௧ܲ =  ߣ଴ + ߣଵܲܫ௧ +  ߣଶܫܰܨ௧ +  ߣଷܨܦܫܰܧ ௧ܶ + ߣସܱܧܺܥ௧ + ߝ௧… (13) 
ܧܺ ௧ܲ =  ߣ଴ + ߣଵܲܫ௧ +  ߣଶܫܰܨ௧ +  ߣଷܨܦܫܰܧ ௧ܶ + ߣସܱܧܺܥ௧ + ߝ௧… (14) 
 
Short-Run Causality Dynamics 
When the long run relationship is established among the variables then we move to ECM 
framework. According to Granger (1998), ECM framework examines the causal relationship among 
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the co-integrated variables. In the model, the short run dynamics are examined by the individual 
coefficients of the lagged terms and the long run causality is found in error correction term (ECT). 
Short run causality is proved through significant lagged explanatory variable while a negative and 
statistically significant ECT proves long run causality.  
Political Instability and International Investment 
Following (ECM) Error Correction Models are estimated for testing relation of Political In-
stability with FDI and FPI: 
Δܨܦܫ௧ =
߮଴ + ∑ ߛଵ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔFDI௧ି௜  + ∑ ߛଶ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔPI௧ି௜  +  ∑ ߛଷ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔGDP௧ି௜ +  ∑ ߛସ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔINF௧ି௜ +
 ∑ ߛହ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔTOP௧ି௜ +  ∑ ߛ଺௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔOEXC௧ି௜ +  ߠܧܥ ௧ܶିଵ + ߝ௧ … (15) 
 
Δܨܲܫ௧ =
 ߮଴ + ∑ ߛଵ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔFPI௧ି௜  + ∑ ߛଶ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔPI௧ି௜  +  ∑ ߛଷ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔGDP௧ି௜ +  ∑ ߛସ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔINF௧ି௜ +
 ∑ ߛହ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔOEXC௧ି௜ +  ߠܧܥ ௧ܶିଵ + ߝ௧ …(16) 
 
Political Instability and International Trade 
Following (ECM) Error Correction Models are estimated for testing relation of Political In-
stability with Imports and Exports: 
Δܫܯ ௧ܲ =
 ߮଴ + ∑ ߛଵ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔIMP௧ି௜  + ∑ ߛଶ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔPI௧ି௜  +  ∑ ߛଷ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔINF௧ି௜ +  ∑ ߛସ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔFDINET௧ି௜ +
 ∑ ߛହ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔOEXC௧ି௜ + ߠܧܥ ௧ܶିଵ  + ߝ௧… (17) 
 
Δܧܺ ௧ܲ =
 ߮଴  + ∑ ߛଵ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔEXP௧ି௜   + ∑ ߛଶ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔPI௧ି௜   + ∑ ߛଷ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔINF௧ି௜  +  ∑ ߛସ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔFDINET௧ି௜ +
  ∑ ߛହ௜௣௜ୀଵ ΔOEXC௧ି௜ +  ߠܧܥ ௧ܶିଵ + ߝ௧… (18) 
In the above equations (15-18), from the long-run co-integration, ECT (Error correction 
term) is derived. By following Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), then we apply the stability tests for the 
selected ARDL models by applying the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) of recur-
sive residuals of test. All the tests are performed in Eviews 10 software. 
 
Results  
Unit Root Test 
The integrating level of all the variables is examined using ADF, PP and DF – GLS tests.  
 
Table 2. Unit Root Tests 
VARIABLES 
ADF PP DF-GLS 
t-stats 
Order of 
Integration t-stats 
Order of 
Integration t-stats 
Order of In-
tegration 
FDI (Inflows) -2.841301*** I(0) -4.156248* I(1) -2.532766* I(0) 
PI index -3.394812* I(1) -4.081344* I(0) -0.857436*** I(1) 
Inflation Rate -2.918756** I(0) -3.016258** I(0) -2.915882* I(0) 
GDP Per Capita -4.68329586* I(0) -4.653868* I(0) -4.746058* I(0) 
Ordinary ex-
change rate -4.156326* I(1) -4.036406* I(1) -3.900176* I(1) 
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VARIABLES 
ADF PP DF-GLS 
t-stats 
Order of 
Integration t-stats 
Order of 
Integration t-stats 
Order of In-
tegration 
Trade Open-
ness -7.094928* I(1) -7.094928* I(1) -1.930757*** I(0) 
Foreign Portfo-
lio Investment -4.669855* I(0) -4.693605* I(0) -4.59517* I(0) 
Exports -6.545064* I(0) -6.543001* I(0) -6.2855* I(0) 
FDI (Net flows) -4.140329* I(1) -3.840875* I(1) -2.289993** I(0) 
Imports -6.042767* I(0) -6.080384* I(0) -5.959515* I(0) 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ Indicate the rejection of null hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Table 2 shows that under ADF test, FDI (Inflows), Inflation Rate, GDP Per Capita, Foreign 
Portfolio Investment, Exports, and Imports are stationary at level. However, Political Instability In-
dex, Ordinary Exchange Rate, Trade Openness, and FDI (Net Flows) are stationary at first differ-
ence. PP unit root test shows that FDI (Inflows), Ordinary Exchange Rate, Trade Openness and FDI 
(Net flows) are stationary at First difference and all other variables are stationary at level. When DF-
GLS unit root test was applied, all the series except PI Index and Ordinary Exchange Rate all are 
found stationary at level. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the lag length structure. 
Lag Length Structure  
The Lag Length is predicted using four different criteria:  
1. Final Prediction Error (FPE) 
2. Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion 
3. Schwarz Information Criterion and  
4. Akaike information criteria (AIC). 
Political Instability and International Investment 
Table 3 depicts the optimal lag length of Foreign Direct Investment and other control va-
riables. Except SC, all the tests predict lag length of 2 out of maximum 4 lag lengths.  
 
Table 3. Lag Length Selection of Foreign Direct Investment 
Lag FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 0.674148 2.440683 2.701913 2.532779 
1 0.206874 1.257617 1.562385* 1.365062 
2 0.201887* 1.230894* 1.579200 1.353688* 
3 0.212550 1.279350 1.756765 1.417493 
‘*’ indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Table 4. Lag Length Selection of Foreign Portfolio Investment 
Lag FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 4.79e-05 -7.110203 -6.892512 -7.033457 
1 4.94e-05* -7.080199* -6.818969* -6.988103* 
2 5.22e-05 -7.027716 -6.722947 -6.920271 
3 5.29e-05 -7.016378 -6.668072 -6.893584 
‘*’ indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
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The results of optimal lag length of Foreign Portfolio Investment and other control variables 
are shown in table 4. All the four tests predict lag length of 1 out of maximum 4 lag lengths.  
Political Instability and International Trade 
It is evident from table 5 that the optimal lag length of imports and other control variables is 
3 out of maximum 4 lag lengths.  
 
Table 5. Lag Length Selection of Imports 
Lag FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 351.5451 8.698552 8.916243 8.775298 
1 321.7222 8.608677 8.869907 8.700773 
2 225.298 8.250687 8.555456 8.358132 
3 218.6531* 8.218429* 8.566736* 8.341224* 
‘*’ indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
All the four tests predict lag length of exports and other control variables is 2 out of maxi-
mum 4. Results are shown in table 6.  
 
Table 6. Lag Length Selection of Exports 
Lag FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 297.5871 8.531921 8.749612 8.608667 
1 231.492 8.279534 8.540764 8.37163 
2 188.7617* 8.073749* 8.378517* 8.181194* 
3 195.924 8.10867 8.456976 8.231464 
‘*’ indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Since in our data some variables are stationary at level and some at first difference, therefore 
it is justified to use ARDL model for determining relationship among the variables. 
ARDL Bound Test for Co-integration  
Political Instability and International Investment 
The results of the ARDL bounds testing approach for Foreign Direct Investment are dis-
played in Table 7. The results confirm that long run relationship between FDI, political instability 
index, inflation rate, GDP and ordinary exchange rate since the F-statistic 4.755687 exceeds the up-
per bound at 5% level. 
 
Table 7. ARDL Bound Testing of Foreign Direct Investment 
Variables F-Statistics Co-integration 
F (FDI/ PI, INF, GDP, OEXC, TOP) 4.755687** Co-integration 
Critical Value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1% 4.045 5.898 
5% 2.962 4.338 
10% 2.483 3.708 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
The lag length is 2. Critical values are obtained from Narayan (2005) case III “Unrestricted intercept and no trend” 
for 40 observations. The number of regressors is k=5. 
 Source: Authors’ Calculation 
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Table 8 portrays the results of the ARDL bounds testing approach for Foreign Portfolio In-
vestment. Findings reveal long run relationship exists between FPI, political instability index, infla-
tion rate, GDP and ordinary exchange rate; the F-statistic 4.388644 exceeds the upper bound at 10% 
level. 
 
Table 8. ARDL Bound Testing of Foreign Portfolio Investment 
Variables F-Statistics Co-integration 
F (FPI/ PI, INF, GDP, OEXC) 4.388644*** Co-integration 
Critical Value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1% 5.017 6.611 
5% 3.547 4.804 
10% 2.932 4.021 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
The lag length is 3. Critical values are obtained from Narayan (2005) case III “Unrestricted intercept and no trend” 
for 40 observations. The number of regressors is k=4.  
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Political Instability and International Trade 
Empirical results of ARDL bound tests of Imports are vivid from table 9. Findings reveal 
that a long run relationship exists between imports, political instability index, inflation rate, foreign 
direct investment and ordinary exchange rate. Since the F-statistic 4.604 exceeds the upper bound at 
10% level.  
 
Table 9. ARDL Bound Testing of Imports 
Variables F-Statistics Co-integration 
F (IMP/ PI, INF, FDINET, OEXC) 4.604067*** Co-integration 
Critical Value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1% 5.017 6.611 
5% 3.547 4.804 
10% 2.932 4.021 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
The lag length is 3. Critical values are obtained from Narayan (2005) case III “Unrestricted intercept and no trend” 
for 40 observations. The number of regressors is k=4.  
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
The results of Exports are clear from table 10. The results prove that long-run relationship 
exists between imports, political instability index, inflation rate, foreign direct investment and ordi-
nary exchange rate. Since the F-statistic 5.899 exceeds the upper bound at 5% level.  
 
Table 10. ARDL Bound Testing of Exports 
Variables F-Statistics Co-integration 
F (EXP/ PI, INF, FDINET, OEXC) 5.899391** Co-integration 
Critical Value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1% 5.018 6.610 
5% 3.548 4.803 
10% 2.933 4.020 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
The lag length is 2. Critical values are obtained from Narayan (2005) case III “Unrestricted intercept and no trend” 
for 40 observations. The number of regressors is k=4. Source: Authors’ Calculation
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Long-Run Analysis 
In the long-run analysis, we will examine the marginal impacts independent and control va-
riables on international investment and trade of Pakistan. 
Political Instability and International Investment 
The estimations of long run equilibrium relationship in equation (11) are listed in table 11 
shows that Political Instability (-0.008011 significant at 5% level) and Ordinary Exchange Rate (-
0.014101 significant at 1% level) pose negative significant impact on FDI; which is consistent with 
the literature. 
 
Table 11. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients of Foreign Direct Investment 
Variables Co-efficient 
C -1.958691 
PI -0.008011** 
INF 0.056633 
GDP 0.044483 
OEXC -0.014101* 
TOP 0.072506 
R2 0.324907 Durbin-Watson stat. 2.404075 
F-Statistic 3.368935 Prob (F-Statistic) 0.013743 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
The long run estimations of Foreign Portfolio Investment from equation (12) are outlined in 
table 12. Results conclude that shows that only Political Instability has significant negative impact 
on Foreign Portfolio Investment (-0.000192 significant at 5% level). 
 
Table 12. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients of Foreign Portfolio Investment 
Variables Co-efficient 
C 0.019744*** 
PI -0.000192** 
INF 0.000186 
GDP 0.000894 
OEXC 5.59E-06 
R2 0.316861 Durbin-Watson stat. 1.822516 
F-Statistic 3.190922 Prob (F-Statistic) 0.033141 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Political Instability and International Trade 
Tables 13 and 14 exhibit the long run estimates of equations (13) and (14) of imports and 
exports respectively. Findings disclose that political instability have negative significant impact on 
imports (-0.033117 significant at 5% level) and exports (-0.615960 significant at 1% level).  
 
Table 13. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients of Imports 
Variables Co-efficient 
C 7.680639 
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Variables Co-efficient 
PI -0.033117** 
FDINET -2.39E-09 
INF -0.605381 
OEXC -0.096916 
R2 0.55881 Durbin-Watson stat. 2.064733 
F-Statistic 3.532700 Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0712492 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Table 14. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients of Exports 
Variables Co-efficient 
C 68.60010* 
PI -0.615960* 
FDINET 1.52E-09 
INF 0.013303 
OEXC 0.008134 
R2 0.275420 Durbin-Watson stat. 2.168400 
F-Statistic 3.420984 Prob (F-Statistic) 0.018056 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Short-Run Analysis 
We estimate equation (15-18) to find the short-run relationship using Error Correction Model 
(ECM) within ARDL framework. 
Political Instability and International Investment 
Table 15 shows the results of ECM for Foreign Direct Investment. It is evident that the Error 
Correction Term is statistically significant at 5% level and negative. It indicates that the feedback 
mechanism exists between FDI and other variables. In other words, ECT is stronger; taking the val-
ue 0.164. In short-run one lag inflation (sig. at 5% level) and two lags ordinary exchange rate (sig. at 
10% level) inversely affects the Foreign Direct Investment.  
 
Table 15. Estimated Short-Run Results of Foreign Direct Investment 
Variables Co-efficient 
C 0.119462 
D(FDI(-1)) 0.552347*** 
D(FDI(-2)) -0.205990 
D(PI(-1)) 0.007478 
D(PI(-2)) 0.003280 
D(INF(-1)) -0.049330** 
D(INF(-2)) 0.034115 
D(GDP(-1)) 0.018321 
D(GDP(-2)) 0.011488 
D(OEXC(-1)) 0.005292 
D(OEXC(-2)) -0.054150*** 
D(TOP(-1)) -0.001117 
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Variables Co-efficient 
D(TOP(-2)) 0.009041 
ECT(-1) -0.164739** it should be negative and significant otherwise 
there is no relationship 
R2 0.513266 Durbin-Watson stat. 1.795361 
F-Statistic 1.946791 Prob (F-Statistic) 0.075247 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
The ECM results of Foreign Portfolio Investment are elaborated in table 16. Results con-
clude that the ECT is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. Hence feedback mechanism 
exists between FPI and other variables. Moreover, the deviation of Foreign Portfolio Investment 
from long-run equilibrium level in one year is corrected only about 1% in the next year. In short-run 
one lag political instability (sig. at 5% level) affects inversely and one lag GDP (sig. at 5% level) 
directly affects the Foreign Portfolio Investment.  
 
Table 16. Estimated Short-Run Results of Foreign Portfolio Investment 
Variables Co-efficient 
C -0.000532 
D(FPI(-1)) 0.135517 
D(PI(-1)) -6.62E-0.5** 
D(INF(-1)) 0.000188 
D(GDP(-1)) 0.001033** 
D(OEXC(-1)) 0.000179 
ECT(-1) -0.011198* 
R2 0.483412 Durbin-Watson stat. 1.903324 
F-Statistic 4.990827 Prob (F-Statistic) 0.001042 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Political Instability and International Trade 
Empirical findings of ECM for imports and exports are shown in Table 17 and Table 18 re-
spectively. It is evident that in both the models the Error Correction Term is negative and statistical-
ly significant at 1% level, indicating the existence of feedback mechanism between imports, exports 
and other variables. In case of imports the ECT indicates that about 85% of the deviation from long-
run equilibrium level of imports in one year is corrected in the next year. No short-run relationship 
is statistically proved in imports model.  
In the export model the value of ECT indicates that when a deviation occurs from long-run 
equilibrium, about 22.4% of it is corrected in the next year. Moreover, inverse statistically signifi-
cant (sig. 5% level) impact of two lags political instability is proved in the short-run.  
 
Table 17. Estimated Short-Run Results of Imports 
Variables Co-efficient 
C 1.808398 
D(IMP(-1)) 0.767462 
D(IMP(-2)) 0.306797 
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Variables Co-efficient 
D(IMP(-3)) 0.23508 
D(PI(-1)) -0.43296 
D(PI(-2)) -0.288892 
D(PI(-3)) -0.186278 
D(FDINET(-1)) -4.36E-09 
D(FDINET(-2)) 7.93E-09 
D(FDINET(-3)) -1.16E-09 
D(INF(-1)) -0.103849 
D(INF(-2)) 1.281154 
D(INF(-3)) -0.952766 
D(OEXC(-1)) -0.146199 
D(OEXC(-2)) -5.24E-01 
D(OEXC(-3)) -5.27E-01 
ECT(-1) -0.85351* 
R2 0.701686 Durbin-Watson stat. 1.799487 
F-Statistic 2.940213 Prob (F-Statistic) 0.01217 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Table 18. Estimated Short-Run Results of Exports 
Variables Co-efficient 
C 0.066273 
D(EXPO(-1)) 0.129277 
D(EXPO(-2)) -0.220189 
D(PI(-1)) 0.526139 
D(PI(-2)) -0.353601** 
D(FDINET(-1)) -2.47E-09 
D(FDINET(-2)) 1.66E-09 
D(INF(-1)) -0.048687 
D(INF(-2)) 0.796399 
D(OEXC(-1)) -0.327159 
D(OEXC(-2)) 0.477608 
ECT(-1) -0.224065* 
R2 0.664997 Durbin-Watson stat. 1.921429 
F-Statistic 4.691931 Prob (F-Statistic) 0.00058 
‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Serial Correlation LM Test Results 
Since the long-run and short-run relationships are tested next step is to look for the serial 
correlation in the ECM models. The LM serial correlation test is applied to test for autocorrelation in 
the above ECM models. The results show that there is no prove of autocorrelation in all the models 
because the probability of F-statistics of all the models of Equation 15-18 is greater than 0.05. Re-
sults are given in the Table 19, 20, 21 and 22. 
Political Instability and International Investment 
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Table 19. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Foreign Direct Investment 
Null Hypothesis: No serial correlation at up to 2 Lags 
F-statistic 1.644537     Prob. F(2,22) 0.2160
Obs*R-squared 4.942245     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.8045
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Table 20. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Foreign Portfolio Investment 
Null Hypothesis: No serial correlation at up to 1 Lag 
F-statistic 0.422554     Prob. F(1,31) 0.5205
Obs*R-squared 0.534452     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.4689
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Political Instability and International Trade 
Table 21. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Imports 
Null Hypothesis: No serial correlation at up to 3 Lags 
F-statistic 0.195884     Prob. F(3,17) 0.8977
Obs*R-squared 1.236273     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.7443
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Table 22. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Exports 
Null Hypothesis: No serial correlation at up to 2 Lags 
F-statistic 0.337688     Prob. F(2,24) 0.7168
Obs*R-squared 1.040078     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.5945
Source: Authors’ Calculation 
 
Stability Tests 
Finally, Borensztein et al. (1998) proposed Cumulative sum (CUSUM) test for the stability 
of ARDL models .  
Political Instability and International Investment 
Figure 2 portrays the CUSUM statistics for Equation (15). It is evident in the figure that the 
plot of CUSUM is within the critical 5% bounds which confirms the long-run relationships among 
Foreign Direct Investment and other variables and stability of coefficient.  
                       CUSUM Test Results  
Figure 2: CUSUM Test Result of Foreign Direct Investment 
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       CUSUM Test Result  
Figure 3: CUSUM Test Result of Foreign Portfolio Investment 
 
The result of CUSUM statistics for Equation (16) are shown in Figure 3. It is found that the 
plot of CUSUM lies within the 5% critical bounds and thus confirms the long-run relationships and 
stability of coefficients among Foreign Portfolio Investment and other variables.  
Political Instability and International Trade 
 
                         CUSUM Test Result  
Figure 4: CUSUM Test Result of Imports 
 
                          CUSUM Test Result           
Figure 5: CUSUM Test Result of Exports 
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Results of CUSUM test for Imports (Equation 17) are exhibited in Figure 4. CUSUM plot lie 
within the 5% critical bounds and hence proves long-run relationships and stability of coefficients 
among Imports and other variables. 
From Figure 5 it can be said that CUSUM plot lies within the 5% critical bounds and thus 
confirms long-run relationships among Exports and other variables.  
 
Conclusion and policy implications 
This study investigates the impact of Political Instability on International Investment and 
Trade from 1976 to 2016. The international investment in any country can be in the form of either 
foreign direct investment or foreign portfolio investment. Moreover, the international trade includes 
imports and exports. This study has made the first attempt to measure the impact of Political Insta-
bility on foreign portfolio investment and imports as well. Previous Literature has only focused on 
foreign direct investment and export. To test the long and short run relationships among the va-
riables, we employed ARDL model. The unit root of all the variables is also tested and it is found 
that all the variables are stationary either at level or at first difference.   
Here the models are also checked for serial correlation through LM test and for stability 
through CUSUM test. Findings conclude that political instability badly hampers both the interna-
tional investment and trade in the long-run. Moreover, in short-run, the political instability signifi-
cantly hinders the foreign portfolio investment and export. Moreover, ordinary exchange rate also 
possesses adverse impact on the foreign direct investment in long run and short run. It is also found 
that inflation adversely affect foreign direct investment and GDP positively affects foreign portfolio 
investment in short run. No significant impact of political instability is found on foreign direct in-
vestment and imports in the long run. The findings are consistent with Nazeer and Masih (2017), 
Nasreen and Anwar (2014), Afza and Anwar (2013), Khan and Akbar (2013), Khan et al. (2015), 
Bashir et al. (2013) and Fosu (2003). The ARDL models are found free from serial correlation. The 
CUSUM test also evinced the stability of the ARDL models.  
Since its inception Pakistan is facing high level political instability due to frequent irregular 
government changes and four-times martial law which sustained almost twenty-eight years of seven-
ty-one years of Pakistan (Zaidi 2017). Every policy needs consistency for the fruits in the future. 
The vulnerable political setup in Pakistan badly affect mostly areas of economy. Fortunately, since 
2008 democracy is in power and there is no irregular government change so far till 2018. So to some 
extent consistency in the policies is playing its vital role in the economy although there is big ques-
tion on the governance issue on the democratic government but it is far better than absolute crash of 
political system.  
Foreign Direct Investment, exports and foreign portfolio investment are highly linked with 
the stability in the policies which is directly related to political setup of the country. In fact, at this 
stage, it is recommended that for the consistency in the policies there should not be any irregular 
government change and it is also recommended that every consecutive democratic government 
should also be bound by law to sustain the long-term on-going policies.  
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Appendix A 
Definitions of Political Instability Index Variables  
Brief definitions of variables of political instability index are outlined here.  
 General Strikes  
General strikes called by political actors for a complete closedown or blockade of economic activi-
ties that can last anywhere from a single to several days.  
 Demonstrations  
It is an assembly of people or procession with an explicit political purpose.  
 Riots  
It is explained as any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of 
physical force.  
 Government Longevity  
Years of Government longevity.  
 Government change  
An instance of change of government including military coups.  
 War  
Dummy Variable. 
 Regime Type  
Democracy, Military led democracy or Military government.  
 
 
 
 
